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Abstract 
This article examines the actual and potential effects that Australian counter-terrorism laws have 
on public discussion and access to information, exploring how democratic commitments to 
media freedom might best be balanced against contemporary demands of national security. It 
analyses how the laws affect the media’s ability to investigate and report on matters of public 
interest. It explains how the research has been conducted; identifies some of the main elements 
of the legal framework and the way that those elements may affect, and sometimes have affected, 
the media; and offers some tentative conclusions about the ways that the media have been 
affected which are not directly, causally attributable to the suite of counter-terrorism laws but 
which are important to understanding the contemporary relationship between media freedom and 
public discussion of matters of public interest where national security is concerned. 
 
 
The tension between press freedom and the tendencies by governments to restrict 
the scope of that freedom is perhaps the archetypal conflict between citizens and 
the state in liberal democracies (Keane, 1991; Schauer 1982). The legal regulation 
of this tension endures and fluctuates in Australia, as it does in the UK and 
elsewhere, but there is a clear legal recognition that the media has a legitimate and 
valuable role in the body politic, enhancing openness and democratic political 
processes (e.g. Chesterman, 2000; Meagher, 2004a). However, since 2001, most 
governments have introduced counter-terrorism laws that limit media freedom. 
These laws are the subject of this article. The focus is on the experience in 
Australia. 
 
Counter-terrorism laws affecting speech have been subjected to extensive analysis 
in some respects. Certainly, the way individual rights and liberties are affected has 
received considerable scrutiny (Australian Law Reform Commission, 2006; 
Barendt, 2005b; Barker, 2005; Conte, 2003; Donohue, 2005-06; Head, 2002; 
Hocking, 2003; Hoffman, 2004; Joseph, 2004; Meagher, 2004b; Tham, 2004). 
However, the institutional effects of the laws have received far less attention. Media 
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organizations have raised concerns about restrictive nature of the laws (Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation, 2005; Australia’s Right to Know, 2007; Herman, 2007: 
59; Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance, 2005), as have others (Moorhouse, 
2006), but the impact of the legislation has only been subjected to a preliminary 
scholarly analysis in Australia (Nash, 2005). In the UK, similar concerns have been 
raised by Cram (2006) and in the USA by the Reporters Committee for Freedom 
of the Press (2005). It is not yet at all clear what effects the laws will have on the 
open and informed public debate that characterizes liberal, democratic countries 
such as Australia. 
 
Against that background, this article outlines a project that aims to identify and 
evaluate the actual and potential effects that counter-terrorism laws have on public 
discussion and access to information, exploring how democratic commitments to 
media freedom might best be balanced against contemporary demands of national 
security.1 It explores limits on media freedom and their implications for the nature 
and quality of public debate on matters of public interest. It does so by analysing 
how the laws affect the media’s ability to investigate and report on terrorism and 
security. 
 
The article begins by setting out the conceptual and empirical frameworks for the 
research. Second, it identifies key elements of the new laws and the way they may, 
and sometimes do, affect the media. Third, it considers how the media have been 
affected in ways that are not directly, causally attributable to the suite of counter-
terrorism laws but which are important to understanding the contemporary 
relationship between media freedom and public discussion of matters of public 
interest where national security is concerned. A brief conclusion draws together 
the implications of the combined direct and indirect effects.  
 
 
Law, Media Freedom and the Challenge of Ascertaining Effects  
Media freedom is founded upon principles of free speech. As well as being 
inherently valuable, free speech is instrumental in maintaining the health and 
vibrancy of a democracy. Free speech, it is said, is important because it enables 
communities to speak and listen and, as such, is central to the making optimal 
moral and political choices about the way we should live (Barendt, 2005a). 
However, this does not mean claims for the legitimacy of free speech are or should 
be a legal, political or rhetorical trump card. Free speech is not an unlimited 
licence. Established critiques of liberal theory suggest that the state has a legitimate 
role in restricting or regulating speech to ensure that individuals are treated with 
regard and respect, and that non-state actors do not corrupt public discourse. The 
perennial questions, of course, are at what point speech can be restricted, on what 
basis, and who decides (Fiss, 1987; Keane, 1991; Schauer, 1982). These issues and 
rationales are familiar ground for practitioners of law, media and politics who deal 
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 with contentious matters of public interest. Invocations of ‘the public’s right to 
know’ and the conceptualization of the media as ‘the fourth estate’ of government 
are second nature to journalists, lawyers and policy makers in the field (Schultz, 
1998). 
 
There is a problem, however, when moving from theoretical analyses of free 
speech, or even from the potential effects of specific laws, towards ascertaining 
whether and how any given laws have actually affected the media. In particular, it 
is often difficult to tell whether restrictive laws have had effects because this may 
involve establishing what has not been said, which is a harder task than 
establishing what has been said. Nonetheless, questions about how the law affects 
media freedom are vitally important both for media actions and law reform. To 
this end, the research responds to the call by Ramraj, Hor and Roach (2005: 7) to 
pay attention to ‘empirical questions concerning the effectiveness of anti-terrorism 
policy’. However, just as established critiques of free speech show that the citizen–
state divide is not straightforward, any attempts to balance rights and security must 
move carefully if the conceptual and practical weaknesses of a simplistic 
opposition are to be avoided in terrorism matters (Roach, 2006). 
 
To meet these challenges, a series of semi-structured interviews was conducted in 
mid-2007. The aim of the interviews was to establish what is happening on the 
ground when the media are reporting on national security issues. Participants were 
identified through the review of the literature, a review of the news media, and 
through formal and informal interviews and conversations with journalists, lawyers 
and academics in the field. Nineteen interviews were conducted. Ten interviewees 
were working journalists. The remaining nine were lawyers working for media 
organizations (in-house or in firms), or lawyers who had been involved in criminal 
proceedings relating to national security and terrorism. The period during which 
the interviews were conducted was arguably important because it was around that 
time that Dr Mohamed Haneef was arrested and charged with terrorism offences 
in circumstances where access to and the release of information was highly 
contentious. 
 
Haneef was arrested in a city south of Brisbane, Australia, where he was held for 
12 days before being charged with ‘recklessly supporting a terrorist organization’ in 
relation to a SIM card he was alleged to have given to a person involved with the 
incidents at Glasgow International Airport on 30 June 2007. The charge did not 
require that he knew or intended to supported an organization, but only that he 
was ‘reckless’ as to that fact. The charges against him were withdrawn when it 
became apparent that there was no evidence to support them, though the 
immigration minister cancelled his visa nonetheless. The Haneef matter is one of 
the most significant and controversial series of events in the law and politics of 
counter-terrorism in Australia and, as such, many interviewees had given a deal of 
Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 6(1) 
 
 
30
thought to the issues that were discussed in the interviews. Following the election 
of a new government in late 2007, the Haneef matter became the subject of a 
formal inquiry (Clarke Inquiry, 2008). 
 
The research focused on major media outlets rather than smaller and community-
based organizations. This was partly due to resource limitations, but it was also 
because, in a framework where the opposition is essentially between state and 
private power, major media organizations are in the best position to navigate the 
difficult issues and limitations involved. The research thus examines how the laws 
affect the strongest actors. That said, there would be good reason to explore the 
position of smaller and community-based organizations because they may feel 
different effects, especially where there is a sense that their communities are being 
targeted by particular laws or other parts of the wider community, including 
perhaps by the major media. 
 
The interviewees were not and were not intended to be journalists or columnists 
whose primary role in their organizations is that of comment on and analysis of 
the legal and political issues surrounding national security. In the same vein, 
interviewees did not include the senior executives of media organizations. The 
reason for these choices was that the aim was to get a picture of what is happening 
when the media want to report on or investigate national security and terrorism: 
hence, the subjects of the interviews were the journalists who are doing that 
reporting, the media lawyers who are giving them advice and making judgements 
about what can or cannot be published, and the lawyers representing the parties in 
trials where there may be attempts to regulate the manner and extent to which the 
media can access and report information that comes before the courts. 
 
While the project and the discussion in this article are centred on issues relating to 
the Australian laws and the media experience in Australia, there are at least three 
ways in which the analysis is more generally significant. First, the practical effect of 
counter-terrorism laws in Australia is that they have an impact on Arab 
communities, and also on Muslim communities (in Australia, the two are often 
conflated). In this way, the laws are very directly related to the reporting of news 
from, about and to those communities. In part, the globalized nature of media 
organizations and news reporting also gives these laws an international dimension, 
as does the way that foreign correspondents are very important in news reporting 
relating to security and terrorism. These concerns were among those at issue at the 
Arab Media Centre’s ‘Testing Journalism’s Boundaries’ conference in 2008 at the 
University of Westminster where this article was first delivered as a conference 
paper. Second, the implications and issues that arise with regard to politics, law and 
law enforcement in Australia might in future be usefully compared to similar 
positions overseas. Third – and the presentations at the conference led me to the 
view that this is more important than I had thought was the case prior to that 
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 conference – an investigation of how Australian counter-terrorism laws affect the 
media is important because it provides the occasion for a critical study of how 
(both putative and real) liberal democratic commitments to press freedom are 
operationalized in the context of national security. This seems important when, as 
many speakers at the conference indicated, the push for democratization and 
stronger press freedoms in Arab countries is of vital importance in reporting Arab 
news. In identifying these factors as significant, comparisons need to be made 
cautiously, especially as journalists in Arab countries work in phenomenally 
different security environments and in political contexts where press freedom does 
not rest on strong political, historical or legal foundations.  
 
 
The Legal Framework and its Immediate Effects 
When media organizations report on national security and terrorism, an extensive 
range of laws comes into play. Much public debate has focused on the newer 
legislative measures specifically directed at terrorism, but traditional forms of 
regulation remain extremely important. The more familiar instruments include 
defamation (especially in investigative reporting where a matter has not come to 
the courts) and contempt laws (which limit the manner and extent of reporting on 
matters from the time a person has been charged until the conclusion of a trial).  
 
The suite of new counter-terrorism laws adds to the traditional regulatory 
framework. Of the many new or amended laws, three in particular potentially have 
(or it has been suggested by media groups that they might have) very significant 
effects on media organizations. These are the powers of the police to issue a notice 
to produce documents; the powers of the Australian Secret Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO) to detain and question people; and powers of the judiciary to 
limit access to evidence and hearings.2  
 
Notices to Produce Documents 
The Australian Federal Police (AFP) have the power to demand that a person 
produce documents. The Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 amended the Crimes Act 1914 
so that when the AFP believes it has reasonable grounds, it can issue a notice to a 
person to produce documents that are relevant to and will assist the investigation 
of ‘a serious terrorism offence’. Documents must relate to matters of either 
finance, the disposal or acquisition of assets, travel, utilities, telephone calls and 
accounts, or residence. The notice may include terms preventing the person 
disclosing the nature or existence of the notice. Failure to produce the documents 
may attract a fine of up to $3300, but breaching disclosure conditions – for 
example, by publishing the fact one has been issued with a notice – is a more 
serious offence carrying a penalty of up to two years’ imprisonment. This 
provision affects the ability of journalists to keep their sources confidential. That, 
in turn, potentially limits access to information because sources cannot be assured 
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of confidentiality. There was no evidence in the interviews that this had in fact 
happened to journalists, though certainly there was an acceptance that notes may 
be subpoenaed and that is a standard risk that journalists face. 
 
Questioning and Detention Powers 
The powers of ASIO, Australia’s domestic intelligence agency, have been 
expanded so that ASIO may seek warrants to enable its agents to question a 
person for the purposes of investigation, or to detain a person for such 
questioning. A warrant may be sought where the minister (and then a judge) is 
satisfied that ‘there are reasonable grounds for believing that issuing the warrant … 
will substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is important in relation to 
a terrorism offence’ and ‘that relying on other methods of collecting that 
intelligence would be ineffective’. 
 
Where a warrant is issued then a person must ‘give information, or produce 
records or things, that is/are or may be relevant to intelligence that is important in 
relation to a terrorism offence’. A refusal to answer questions may attract a penalty 
of five years imprisonment. Where secrecy conditions attach to the warrant then 
disclosing its existence is punishable by two years imprisonment. Further, in the 
two years after the warrant expires it will be an offence to disclose any ‘operational 
information’ that is known by virtue of the issue of the warrant or questioning 
under it. This offence is punishable by five years’ imprisonment. Here, ‘operational 
information’ is defined as including an ‘operational capability, method or plan’. 
This means that the existence of the warrant still cannot be disclosed because, on 
the face of it, the use of warrants to obtain intelligence would seem to be an 
operational method. It would seem almost impossible to disclose any information 
acquired because, even though the prohibition applies only to operational 
information, the nature of intelligence work makes it impossible to know whether 
something is or is not ‘operational information’. 
 
For the media, these laws render journalists vulnerable to ASIO questioning if the 
agency thinks the journalist may have information that will be useful for the 
collection of intelligence relating to terrorism offences. The journalist need not be 
aware that they have information which the authorities see as significant, and the 
information need not be anything admissible in evidence at a criminal trial. 
Sources, then, cannot be sure that confidentiality will be maintained.  
 
It might be argued that journalists can be compelled to reveal their sources under 
the law as it stands and that a failure to do so may render the journalist vulnerable 
to imprisonment on the grounds they will be in contempt of court. However, 
ASIO powers are very different from contempt laws. Experience suggests that 
contempt penalties are almost certain to be less (Senate Standing Committee, 
1994). In addition, secrecy provisions accompanying ASIO warrants mean that it is 
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 probably impossible to gather any support from other journalists, media 
organizations or a member of parliament to try to resist the demands. Third, and 
this is the most significant difference and very important, the way in which 
journalists can be brought before the courts is fundamentally different under the 
ASIO laws than under the general law.  
 
In the ordinary course of events, journalists will only be required to identify 
sources when a case is before the courts. For example, where a person is 
prosecuted on suspicion of having leaked information to the press, then a 
journalist may then be asked to reveal the source of information they obtained for 
a story. Adhering to their Code of Ethics, the journalist will not do so and is 
vulnerable to punishment for contempt. However, ASIO laws do not require the 
state to have compiled a case against a person who is to be prosecuted. Rather, the 
ASIO laws enable the security authorities to issue a questioning warrant and ask 
the journalist, ‘Who is your source?’ A journalist who stays silent or says they will 
not reveal their sources will have committed an offence punishable by five years’ 
jail. 
 
While interviewees thought it unlikely that journalists would be subjected to 
questioning and detention, the coercive powers under these laws have the potential 
to affect the way journalists, editors and media lawyers make judgements and 
decisions about news gathering and publication. However, even if not applied to 
journalists, the secrecy of the regime and the punishments for offences certainly 
means that it will be very difficult to access and publish information about the 
ways the laws are applied in the community more generally. There was 
considerable concern about the extent to which the authorities would pursue a 
breach of laws – for instance, publishing the fact that a warrant existed or 
publishing an answer to a question – but a great difference of opinion was evident. 
On one set of views, it was thought that police would pursue a breach of the law 
without hesitation, and this was especially thought to be the case where any secrecy 
provisions had been breached. The rationales, it was thought, could range from 
teaching the media a lesson, through to the need to pursue secrecy breaches 
aggressively in order to justify the authorities’ standard position that secrecy is 
extremely important. An alternative view was expressed by other interviewees who 
thought there would be a great reluctance to pursue the media because it is such a 
powerful institution and tends to ‘bite back’. However, the uncertainty of what 
might happen was clearly a matter of some concern.  
 
Secrecy in Court 
The third set of important laws governs court reporting. All courts can close 
proceedings at some times but the National Security Information (Civil and 
Criminal Proceedings) Act 2004 (‘the NSI laws’) places substantial new restrictions 
on media access to evidence.  
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The laws derive from the government’s concern that court proceedings are usually 
open to the public and defendants ordinarily know all the evidence against them, 
but sometimes this evidence may prejudice national security. In some 
circumstances the government would not want any information at all revealed to 
the public or even to the defendant. However, without evidence the charges 
against an accused could not be proved or the trial may be unfair to the accused (R 
v. Lappas and Dowling [2001]). The unpalatable alternative would be that all or some 
of the charges could be withdrawn. Rather than risk this, the Commonwealth 
enacted the NSI laws with the stated objects being ‘to prevent the disclosure of 
information … where the disclosure is likely to prejudice national security, except 
to the extent that preventing the disclosure would seriously interfere with the 
administration of justice’. The effect is that a trial can proceed even where the 
accused will not have access to all the evidence relied on by the prosecution. 
Evidence may be given, for example, in the form of summaries of documents, 
rather than the original and complete documents being tendered and being the 
subject of cross-examination.  
The NSI procedure is complex and time-consuming. Where the prosecutor or 
defendant intends to rely on evidence relating to national security then they must 
notify the Attorney-General and the court. Then, the Attorney-General evaluates 
the extent to which the evidence ‘is likely to prejudice national security’, which is 
defined to mean that ‘there is a real, and not merely a remote, possibility that the 
disclosure will prejudice national security’. The Attorney-General may then ask the 
court to rely on a summarized form of the evidence, or the relevant document may 
have information deleted from it, or may ask that a witness not be called for 
examination. Next, the court then hears argument about the extent to which the 
Attorney-General’s view should prevail. The court will be closed for this argument.  
 
Under section 31 of the Act, the court can decide to prohibit disclosure, permit 
some disclosure, or permit full disclosure. The court must consider: 
− whether, having regard to the Attorney-General’s certificate, there would 
be a risk of prejudice to national security [if the information was 
disclosed in court]; [and] 
− whether any such order would have a [not insubstantial, insignificant or 
trivial] adverse effect on the defendant’s right to receive a fair hearing, 
including in particular on the conduct of his or her defence; [and]  
− any other matter the court considers relevant.  
The court must give greatest weight to the first of these factors.  
 
Media organizations have two significant problems in these circumstances. First, 
while the court may hear media submissions about how evidence should be dealt 
with, the media lawyers will have been totally excluded from the process up to that 
point. As one lawyer put it, ‘we are making submissions in the dark’. Put simply, it 
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 is impossible to make a persuasive argument in any given set of circumstances 
when you do not know, even in outline form, what the circumstances are. It was 
suggested by another lawyer that the legal representatives of media organizations 
could and should be treated differently from their clients because, as lawyers, they 
are officers of the court. That is, even if represented or reporting journalists are 
not permitted to be in court, their lawyers should be permitted to be there. Second, 
even where submissions might be made effectively, the legislation itself does not 
provide for any consideration of open justice unless the court chooses to consider 
it under the ‘any other matter’ heading. With the scales deliberately weighted in 
favour of the national security interest, it will be difficult to persuade the court that 
open justice should be preferred.  
 
The NSI legislation also provides an alternative way of dealing with security-related 
information, but it is potentially even more restrictive. Under section 22 the 
prosecutor and defendant may reach an agreement about how they will deal with 
evidence. It may be that they agree on a far more restrictive arrangement than the 
court would order were disclosure issues contested. The court must approve any 
proposed agreement but, not least because contested procedures are disruptive and 
time-consuming, the court may decide that the agreement is acceptable. It was said 
by one lawyer that an agreement ‘means the shutters go up’ and nothing is revealed 
to the media.  
 
Of the statutes discussed above, the interviews suggested that only the last of these 
has had any clearly identifiable effects. Terrorism cases are invariably and 
appropriately matters of great public interest but by June 2008 the NSI Act had 
been invoked in proceedings involving 28 defendants (Attorney-General’s 
Department, 2008: 5). Although suppression orders could possibly have been used 
to the same effect, the media would at least have been able to make informed 
submissions if suppression orders were proposed.  
 
It does not appear that notices to produce have been issued against journalists 
during investigations. However, documents and notes have been subpoenaed in 
several instances relating to the prosecution of offences. The best known in 
Australia concerns the prosecution of Jack Thomas. After Thomas was acquitted 
of some terrorism charges, the ABC broadcast interviews they had conducted with 
him before the trial took place (Neighbour, 2006). These interviews became the 
basis on which a re-trial was successfully sought (R v. Thomas). The secrecy 
provisions associated with the provisions of the ASIO laws means that while there 
is nothing to indicate that any of those laws have been relied upon with respect to 
the media, one cannot be certain. Several journalists commented that they were 
certainly not aware of any use of the laws, but this was immediately followed with 
a comment to the effect of, ‘But we don’t know!’ It may also be that the ability to 
intercept phone calls may mean that investigating agencies do not need to rely on 
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more up-front procedures. The sense of most journalists and lawyers was that 
journalists’ phones are not being monitored directly, but they are vulnerable to 
being monitored when they make or receive calls to people whose conversations 
are being intercepted.  
 
 
Indirect and Contextual Effects  
Although counter-terrorism laws appear to have had only limited direct effects on 
the media, does it necessarily follow that the laws are having no other significant 
effects on media freedom? The interviews suggest that the media have many 
concerns about their freedom and that anti-terrorism laws are relevant to those 
concerns, even if not in a direct or causal way. 
 
Understanding the Laws 
One of the most disarmingly frank comments made was by a journalist who, in 
response to a question of what they thought that journalists could do better in 
dealing with the laws was: ‘Well, we could do a better job of understanding them.’ 
It was a simple statement of the difficulties that face journalists in dealing with the 
laws: they are very, very difficult to understand for anyone not versed in reading 
legislation. And, as a lawyer put it to me, even for those who are, the laws are still a 
somewhat complex maze. There are very few lawyers working with the laws on a 
regular basis, and especially not media lawyers. A lawyer who had provided advice 
on publication regarding a terrorism matter said that they ‘could recite the law of 
defamation for you from beginning to end right here and now, but I’d have to 
have a careful look at the stuff to be able to do any more than talk in general 
terms’. The implications of this complexity cannot be understated.  
 
First, it may be difficult to ascertain under just what laws a person has been 
detained by police. The freedom to report that a person has been detained will vary 
according to the laws that have been used to detain the person. Second, even once 
the journalists know what laws are at work, there is the next question of what can 
or cannot be published. For example, in the Haneef matter there was a reluctance 
to report the name of the magistrate hearing the initial applications to extend the 
time for questioning. However, there was no suppression order or anything like it 
that prevented the name from being published. Third, there were journalists who 
found that the legal advice they were receiving was not immediately helpful 
because, for instance, the lawyers were uncertain about examining case-related 
documents that had been acquired by the journalists. One had the lawyer’s 
response relayed to them by a staff member: ‘I can’t look at those documents. I’m 
not talking to [that journalist]. I’ll go jail for five years.’ The documents in question 
were not, however, related to ASIO matters. They were documents that were 
available from ordinary sources in the normal course of events.  
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 It may well be the case that many documents can actually be accessed, and much 
can be reported, but the experience of journalists was that few people involved in 
the process had a good grasp of what was and was not permissible where terrorism 
cases were concerned. This was exemplified by the ongoing use of incorrect terms. 
For example, even some weeks after the Haneef matter ‘it was being referred to 
[by journalists and others] as “preventative detention” when it was not’. 
 
In all, the sense of journalists, even those who are dealing regularly with national 
security matters, was that they themselves frequently did not have a really sound 
grasp of the laws. They quite simply could not get that grasp because of the 
complexity of the legislation and because of the willingness of the government and 
the police to deal with information in a way that did not help put the full story into 
its correct legal context and get it out into the public domain. 
 
The most worrying implication of the complexity of the laws is that it makes it 
very, very difficult for journalists to ask the right questions. For example, when a 
minister makes a statement about the status of the investigation or detention of a 
person, it is almost impossible to ask the question that will compel a more 
complete explanation of the facts and their context. One example of this is the 
position of Dr Haneef while he was being questioned: it was very unclear to the 
large number of journalists and their lawyers exactly on what basis Haneef was 
being held and how the detention could proceed, but this point could only be 
pushed in general terms rather than questions that went directly to the legal basis 
of detention.  
 
Cultivation of Sources 
The interview data suggests that there is good reason to think that the range of 
counter-terrorism laws is having a meaningful effect on the ability of journalists to 
cultivate good sources.  
The complexity of the laws is relevant here again. It affects journalists’ access to 
information because it is easy for police or security agencies to suggest that the 
laws are such that information cannot be released, or should not be published, or 
that requests to deal with information in certain ways should be complied with. 
But, similarly, the wide scope of the laws is also important. These factors can affect 
the information that sources (such as families or friends of people who are under 
investigation) will provide to journalists. I was told on more than one occasion that 
the families of suspects ‘go to ground’ once a person is arrested. A journalist said 
the type of comment that police may make to a family in warning them not to talk 
to the media was, ‘Well, you know, we’ve got a lot of power under the new laws.’ 
When I discussed this with a lawyer, the lawyer’s response was: 
 
[The journalist] is right. They do have a lot of powers. [Families of suspects] 
are warned by their lawyers not to talk to the media because if they go and 
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say to a television camera, ‘My brother is a good man and I stand by him’ 
then they run the risk of being prosecuted for supporting terrorism.  
 
In response to the question of whether this advice is heeded and is thus the reason 
for the reluctance to talk to the media, one lawyer’s response was, ‘It varies. But 
they [take notice of the advice] after the first time their comments are mis-
reported.’ 
 
At a wider level, the interviews revealed a deep concern that the relationship 
between Muslim communities and the media was strained in a way that was 
reducing the extent to which those communities trusted the media. The strongest 
comment was that ‘the media are seen as proxies for the authorities’. Others 
tended to think it was more a question of marginalization and distrust of major 
media organizations which had not treated Muslim communities well and those 
communities were, in the context of a wider sense of marginalization, less willing 
to trust the media. The perception, it was said, is that even if people accepted that 
the media were not working for the police then it was still thought that some 
journalists ‘may look at the police favourably … or their work will be used by the 
authorities at the end of the day. And there has been a bit of truth in that.’ 
Community cautiousness seems justified because it appears the authorities monitor 
and exploit the way that a person deals with the media. Added to this, argued one 
journalist, the Australian media is, on the whole, ‘all a bit Anglo’ and does not have 
the base of community contacts that provides a base for the trust in the media that 
is needed. 
 
Silence has a significant effect on what the public gets to know. When someone 
will not speak to the media then a journalist’s inquiries and analysis will take 
account of that. If it is not clear why a person refuses to speak then that may lead 
to adverse judgments: ‘if you ask a question and they don’t answer, you might 
form a different judgment about why they aren’t speaking, whether they’ve got 
something to hide. It has an impact on the story.’ One journalist with significant 
contacts in Muslim and Arab communities argued that there was a more 
widespread silencing of opinion, stretching from individual interviews through to 
general discussion and talkback radio: ‘I think people were forthcoming before, 
they were much more vocal.… I think that people have become much more 
paranoid now [and] they’re not speaking.… There’s a self-censorship.’ This, it was 
said, is a cause for concern: ‘We don’t know what their thoughts are because 
they’re not talking any more.’ 
 
Access to Information  
The principles of open justice dictate that information which comes before the 
courts should usually be available. For example, transcripts of trials or documents 
tendered in evidence may be accessible. In addition, there may well be a large 
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 amount of information which should still be accessible to the public and over the 
release of which there are no formal restrictions. However, the experience of 
journalists has been that it is very difficult to get information where terrorism cases 
are concerned. The reason for this, according to both lawyers and journalists 
interviewed, is all tied up with questions of trust and the lawyer’s or court’s 
knowledge of the journalists.  
 
For an unfamiliar journalist to obtain information will be difficult for any number 
of reasons. Among them, lawyers and court staff are simply busy. Lawyers 
especially may not be certain about how information will be used, and may prefer 
that as little information about their client as possible is out in the public domain. 
On the other hand, where journalists are familiar with the processes of the courts 
and regularly in touch with the lawyers appearing in them, then they will have 
much better access to information. It was observed by almost every journalist and 
lawyer I spoke to that it was not a coincidence that the transcript of an interview in 
the Haneef matter was leaked to a Brisbane-based journalist, and a well-respected 
one at that.  
 
In a similar vein, observations were made by numerous journalists about the 
importance of having people on the ground in any given place so that they can get 
reliable information. Once more, the Haneef case was cited as an example of this 
where, on the one hand, the best work was coming from the Brisbane-based 
Hedley Thomas of The Australian, while, on the other, most of those covering the 
story had very little knowledge of the Gold Coast area which was the focus of 
attention for a deal of the time. This theme was picked up again in relation to the 
need to have good international sources. 
 
The Haneef matter (once more) was cited by several interviewees as an example of 
the value of international correspondents. The ABC’s Raphael Epstein was able to 
get to the heart of information in London because he was based in London, and 
the Fairfax papers had someone in Bangalore ‘who was able to humanize Haneef 
by providing pictures of the family’. In an environment where the global reach of 
national security issues is clearly important, the media needs to address that reach 
appropriately. 
 
Both of the matters above have significant resource implications and requirements. 
However, if the media is to be able to provide quality reporting of events then it 
appears from the interview data that the best way to do so is to resource 
journalism, even though it may not provide big stories on an ongoing basis. The 
benefit is that court reporters and a diverse range of international correspondents 
will be able to get information that is difficult to access otherwise. Relying on 
reciprocal arrangements is not suitable, as one journalist put it, ‘because NBC or 
the BBC or whoever it is are just not interested in the same stories or the same 
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aspects of those stories that an Australian audience is’. In short, while an important 
aspect of media freedom and public discussion relates to issues of regulation, the 
investment of resources is a dimension that cannot be ignored.  
 
Patterns of Policing and Media Management 
Where terrorism matters are concerned, almost all journalists and lawyers 
expressed deep reservations about the patterns of policing and media management. 
The widespread perception was that use of the phrase ‘operational information’ 
was deliberately employed to enable both the government and the police to 
selectively disclose or withhold information. Among the greater concerns was that, 
while to some extent there was a sense that this was to be expected of ministers 
because of the inherently political nature of government (though it was certainly 
seen as unacceptable), there was a widespread sense that policing had been 
politicized in a way that was at once detrimental to the public’s access to 
information and analysis, and simultaneously being developed by state police 
forces following the lead of their federal counterparts. Four particular examples 
were given in the interviews.  
 
One related to the presence of television cameras (from one organization only) at a 
raid by the AFP. The other concerned the perceived strategic use of press 
conferences between the time a person was arrested and charged, and the time – 
which is often just hours – the person came before a court to apply for bail. This 
attracted particular criticism from two lawyers who noted that the Commonwealth 
was supposed to be a model litigant and the use of press conferences in this way 
was inconsistent with that. It was also noted that press conferences that outlined a 
case against the accused put the defence lawyer immediately on the back foot 
because ‘the police are not subject to ethical duties not to misrepresent 
information’, whereas lawyers have an ethical obligation that prevents them from 
doing so. The third concerned the prosecuting or investigating bodies making 
applications for orders out of court hours – for instance, in the evening at a judge’s 
home – because this then prevented the media attending what would in the 
ordinary course of events be an open hearing. The fourth concerned the treatment 
of leaks of confidential information from within government or police. There was 
a clear consensus from both lawyers and journalists that the selective 
(un)willingness to pursue and identify leaks was part and parcel of a wider strategy 
to shut down access to information. 
 
While none of this can be sheeted home as being directly attributable to the 
enactment of the anti-terrorism laws, these matters were certainly seen by the 
journalists and lawyers as a key aspect of how the state deals with and manages 
information that reaches the media and the public. There was certainly no sense 
conveyed by the interviewees that a change of government would see things 
change in any significant sense. These are patterns that require much more 
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 investigation, especially with respect to the relationship between (at least) policing, 
media management and the substance of the anti-terrorism laws.  
 
 
Conclusions, Implications and the State of Reporting on National Security 
In ascertaining and evaluating the effects of laws, the combination of direct and 
indirect effects, the impossibility of knowing all the facts that one needs to know 
in order to judge the behaviour of security authorities (for there will be genuine 
reasons for secrecy in some instances), and the high levels of distrust pose major 
hurdles for any analysis of or judgement about the effects of the laws. Having said 
that, at least some conclusions can fruitfully be drawn. 
 
In spite of the various hurdles journalists face in dealing with national security 
matters, their commitment to rigorous reporting seems strong. There was 
absolutely no evidence of reluctance to pursue stories that might place journalists 
in a difficult position with respect to the need to protect their sources in the face 
of prosecution. By the same token, there was a strong commitment to not 
undermining policing and investigation of matters involving terrorism. There was 
no expression of doubt that the security agencies have reason to be concerned 
about terrorism. But there were deep doubts and reservations harboured about the 
way that the approach tended to be one of non-disclosure and selective disclosure 
of information. The mistreatment of the Haneef case generally left the 
interviewees I spoke with of the strong opinion that the media have a vital role to 
play as a watchdog. One journalist said of Haneef, ‘if it wasn’t for the media 
attention … he would have been left in [the cells] or just deported. His goose 
would have been cooked.’ 
 
The laws have clearly had a direct effect on court reporting. This is worrying 
because it is in courts that the public can legitimately expect that much information 
will be brought to light, and it is in courts that information is tested and 
scrutinised. In courts, it is difficult for government, police, other agencies of the 
state, or anyone else to spin or manipulate information. The NSI laws cast 
something of a pall over this process. They require the public to have a great deal 
of trust in legal institutions and processes, and in the state and its agencies. The 
interviews suggest that scepticism and distrust is a constant feature of the 
interactions involved in news gathering and reporting. These themes feed into the 
indirect and contextual effects of counter-terrorism laws. 
 
Where news from and about Arab and Muslim communities is concerned, there is 
reason to see the levels of distrust as heightened. There is insufficient data in the 
interviews to draw any firm conclusion about whether this is significantly affecting 
the way news is gathered or reported, but – when read in light of other direct and 
indirect effects – there does seem to be enough to suggest that there is good 
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reason to be concerned and that the effects need to be ascertained with greater 
precision, and actions should be considered which alleviate potential and actual 
negative effects.  
 
The interviews reveal the need for a much greater degree of openness by the 
authorities: where something can be made public, then it should be made public. 
The security authorities will almost inevitably tend to err on the side of caution 
when it comes to openness, but there is a difference between erring on the side of 
caution and keeping information hidden unnecessarily. It is difficult to know 
whether the latter is in fact happening, but media practitioners seem fairly 
convinced that it is. At the very least, that perception needs to be addressed 
because it fosters a culture of distrust. Similarly, whether or not media 
organizations are aligned with authorities in their treatment of marginalized Arab 
and Muslim communities, the perception of such an alignment needs to be 
carefully and thoroughly addressed.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1 The initial stages of this research were funded by a Macquarie University Research 
Development Grant. I am grateful to Philippa Hofbrucker and Jonathan Light for their 
research assistance on the project and to all those who agreed to be interviewed. An earlier 
version of this article was released as a working paper (McNamara, 2007) and I am grateful 
for the opportunity to present at the Arab Media Centre’s ‘Testing Journalism’s Boundaries’ 
conference at the University of Westminster, 2008. For the major publication of the 
research findings see McNamara (2009). 
2 The discussion here is presented for a non-legal audience and will avoid many technical 
but often significant aspects of the laws. It also omits references to some statutes and 
specific sections of legislation. For a detailed analysis, see McNamara (2009). 
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